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China’s policy-makers argued that WTO accession and the accompanying trade 
liberalization would have a beneficial impact on the domestic economy. China’s 
import tariffs differed tremendously across industry in the earlier years, but converged 
to an almost uniform low level after WTO entry. We exploit sectoral variation in the 
extent of tariff reduction to identify the impact of increased import competition on 
firm performance and its contribution to the significant productivity growth over the 
1995–2007 period. We find evidence of strong downward pressure on prices and 
mark-ups, but limited evidence that imports took away market share from domestic 
firms. Furthermore, much of the effects on sectoral productivity come from changes at 
the extensive margin. Sectors that liberalized most tend to attract especially 
productive entrants, private firms in particular, which can be rationalized by an 
increase in the minimum productivity threshold needed to survive in these sectors. 
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“The competition arising [from WTO membership] will also promote a more rapid and more healthy 
development of China’s national economy” 
Premier Zhu Rongji (Press release, Washington, DC, April 1999) 
 
1. Introduction 
China has enjoyed impressive productivity growth in its manufacturing sector for a decade or more 
(Brandt, Van Biesebroeck and Zhang, 2012).  In most narratives, the opening to the international 
economy and the growth of foreign trade are viewed as key drivers.  This process began in earnest in the 
early 1980s with the establishment of the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) and Economic and Technical 
Development Zones (EDTZ) in coastal cities. New momentum may have come with China’s entry into 
the WTO.  Constrained by domestic political economy considerations in their efforts to restructure major 
segments of industry, Chinese leaders such as Premier Zhu Rongji believed that reforms mandated as a 
condition for WTO accession would be a catalyst for change.
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Drawing on a firm-level data set that spans the period 1995-2007, our primary purpose is to analyze 
the effect of several dimensions of policy reforms on firm and sector-level productivity. Over this period, 
industry-level TFP growth averaged more than 12 percent per annum. The central hypothesis we wish to 
examine is whether the dispersion in productivity growth we observe within the manufacturing sector, as 
shown in Figure 1, can be linked to these WTO-related policies; and if so, through what channels.  China 
entered the WTO at the end of 2001, but many policy changes actually predate its entry.  Drawing on 
information we collected on import tariffs, non-tariff barriers and FDI restrictions over the entire period, 
we investigate the relative importance of alternative mechanisms through which policy changes may have 
mattered. 
We focus on reform efforts that facilitated access to the domestic Chinese market for the rest of the 
world, not on the effects coming from China’s access to overseas markets and exports.  Our rationale for 
doing so is two-fold.   First, over the period we examine, eighty percent of China’s manufacturing output 
was consistently sold domestically (Brandt and Thun, 2010).  Exports are an important part of the 
Chinese economy, but even more important is manufacturing activity directed to the domestic market, 
including intermediate inputs.  Moreover, through the processing trade regime, which represents more 
                                                 
1 The message in the above quote, made after ironing out final details about the WTO accession with President 
Clinton, is echoed by several researchers. For example, Lardy and Branstetter (2008) also view more competition as 
an essential source of pressure that forced structural reforms. 
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than half of China’s total trade, exporting firms already benefitted from tariff-free imports of 
intermediates.  Second, even before entry into the WTO, China already enjoyed most-favored nation 
status in several countries, albeit on an annually-renewable basis in the United States.
2
  Elimination of this 
uncertainty is likely to have had positive effects on Chinese firms, but such a benefit is hard to quantify 
and we conjecture it is likely to be smaller than the effects coming through increased competition in the 
domestic market.    
To make our argument credible, we need an identification strategy that causally links policy changes 
to performance changes.  Reverse causality due to policy endogeneity is an intuitive and often plausible 
alternative explanation for a positive correlation (Besley and Case, 2000).  Policy makers might have 
lowered import tariffs selectively after learning which sectors are most likely to enjoy strong productivity 
growth and thus be able to cope with increased foreign competition.  We argue that the striking 
uniformity of the post-reform import tariff rates makes this reverse causality an unlikely explanation.  
Policy changes are almost entirely the result of moving all sectors to the same (low) level of tariff 
protection, making endogeneity a less serious issue. 
The sheer size of our data set helps to pin down the effects of liberalization.  We observe the universe 
of state-owned firms and all other firms (collective, private and foreign) with annual sales above 5 million 
RMB.  Limited to the manufacturing sector and the 1998-2007 period, this results in a sample of 2.05 
million observations across 536,945 unique firms.  As a result, we can include detailed 4-digit industry 
fixed effects and lagged tariff levels even in a regression in first differences without losing all identifying 
power.  
Entry into the WTO required large reductions of import tariffs, as well as the elimination of numerous 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs).  Trade liberalization was accompanied by a lessening of restrictions on foreign 
direct investment (FDI). We focus primarily on the role of tariff reductions, which are observed most 
accurately, but also look for links with the other two policy variables.  To the extent that changes in NTBs 
and FDI restrictions are correlated with tariff reductions, their effects will be subsumed in the tariff 
liberalization effects.  In principle, import tariffs could matter in two ways: through the effect on prices of 
imports that compete with locally manufactured goods, and through the prices (as well as quality and 
variety) of imported intermediate goods (Topalova and Khandelwal 2011). We focus on the combined 
effect, using the change in effective rate of protection as explanatory variable, but we have also estimated 
the effects of tariffs on outputs and inputs separately as a sensitivity check. 
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 In the EU, there was no annual renewal process, but a surge of Chinese imports in Europe could very well have led 
to reinstatement of discriminatory tariffs. This is exactly what happened when the MFA (Multi-Fiber Agreement) 
for apparel and textile products ended in 2006. 
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To build confidence in our argument, we carefully examine the mechanism through which the policy 
change had its effect. We estimate the effects of tariff liberalization on several dependent variables using 
the same specification for each. The results establish that the cross-sectoral variation in liberalization was 
only weakly related to the variation in import growth, while the link with reductions in sectoral price 
indices and price-cost margins is much stronger. In particular, despite a very low import share for most 
inputs, tariff cuts for inputs are passed-through one-for-one into the sectoral input price indices. In the 
short run, domestic firms can match price reductions for imports by lowering price-cost margins, but in 
the long run these cuts must be backed up by productivity increases.    
Tariff reduction is found to play an important role there, but the association between productivity 
growth and tariff reductions is stronger at the sector than at the firm level. We investigate potential 
explanations by decomposing the sector-level productivity growth into three components and using each 
one as a separate dependent variable in the same specification as before. The link between tariff 
liberalization and the contribution of net entry to sector productivity is by far the strongest of the three. 
The beneficial effect of reallocating resources from exiting to entering firms is strongly associated with 
the liberalization. This effect is working primarily through the entry of especially productive private firms 
in more competitive sectors.  Private sector entry is large in nearly all sectors over this period, but the 
“quality” of the entrants is increasing in the degree of competition they will face.  Falling tariffs 
effectively raise the productivity threshold that these firms must achieve in order for entry to be 
profitable. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as following. Section 2 discusses the history of China’s 
relevant policies. Section 3 reviews the literature on trade liberalization effects and motivates the 
identification strategy of this paper. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 shows the empirical findings 
on the impact of the tariff reduction on various variables of interest and pins down the channels through 
which it affects industry and firm-level productivity growth. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Liberalization of China’s foreign trade and investment regime  
2.1  Evolution of the policy regime 
In the late 1970s China embarked on a radical economic reform path that opened its economy to the rest 
of the world.  Beginning in 1980 with the establishment of the four Special Economic Zones (Shenzhen, 
Xiamen, Zhuhai, and Shantou) and in 1984 with the Economic and Technical Development Zones in 
fourteen coastal cities, China encouraged foreign direct investment (FDI) to develop a manufacturing 
export sector through the importation of much-needed capital, managerial know-how, and technology.  
Outside of these zones it allowed the importation and licensing of new technologies and capital goods as 
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part of a policy of modernizing existing domestic enterprises.  It concurrently started to reduce tariff and 
non-tariff barriers to trade, and to extend direct trading rights to firms, culminating in its entry into the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.  China’s renewed openness combined with domestic 
economic and institutional reform initiatives served as important catalysts for economic growth which has 
averaged nearly 8 percent per annum in terms of GNP per capita.  
2.2  Quantifying the reduction in protectionism 
Branstetter and Lardy (2008) observe that even before its accession to WTO at the end of 2001, China’s 
manufacturing sector was already relatively open on several dimensions.  First, as part of a policy of 
encouraging FDI for exporting, China allowed the duty-free importation of raw materials and parts and 
components involved in export processing, as well as the capital equipment to be used.  Exemption of 
import duties was further expanded in the late-half of the 1990s to certain type of domestic firms and 
organizations.  Branstetter and Lardy (2008) report that in 2000 less than 40 percent of imports were 
subject to tariffs.  Second, beginning in the early 1990s, China started to lower its domestic tariffs.  The 
average tariff at the 8-digit HS level was lowered from an average of 43.2 percent in 1992 to 15.3 in 
2001.  This was accompanied by a reduction in the share of imports regulated by non-tariff barriers 
through licenses and quotas (Branstetter and Lardy, p. 635).   
In Figure 2 we plot the evolution of the fraction of sectors covered by an average import tariff in 
excess of fifteen percent, or that contain a product subject to a nontariff barrier or FDI restriction or 
prohibition.  Import tariffs are set at the 8-digit level of the Harmonized System product classification.  
We map them into China’s Industrial Classification (CIC) system at the 4-digit level for the firm and 
industry-level analysis.
3
  To avoid biasing the sectoral average by the low trade volumes in heavily 
protected product lines, we use an unweighted average.  Input tariffs are a weighted average of output 
tariffs, using industry-input shares from the 2002 Input-Output (IO) table.  Reflecting the higher level of 
aggregation of the Chinese IO table, the input tariffs are effectively at the 3-digit level.  By constructing a 
consistent industry classification over time, accounting for the important reforms in 2003, we obtain a 
measure of inward tariff protection at the industry that is comparable over the 1995 to 2007 period.  
Drawing on annual circulars of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and the 
Ministry of Commerce, we also assembled information on the licensing of imports and exports.  The 
measure of non-tariff barriers in Figure 2 is the fraction of sectors, at the 4-digit CIC level, that contains 
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 We extend the HS–CIC concordance table created by the NBS to include all manufactured products (HS) and 
manufacturing sectors (CIC) and correct several mistakes (about 100). Changes in the HS system in 2002 (affecting 
nearly ten percent of all product lines) and in the CIC system in 2003 required multiple concordance tables. 
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at least one 8-digit HS product subject to an import license.  It declined from 15.3% in 1997 to 1.2% in 
2007 after a brief rise to 22.6% in 2000.  The weighted average fraction of products subject to such a 
license is much smaller, declining from 5.5% to 0.04% over the same period.
4
  Information on FDI 
restrictions comes from the same sources.  Sectors can be subject to an FDI restriction or a total 
prohibition and the indicator in Figure 2 includes either.  The total number of sectors subject to some 
form of FDI restriction declined from a high of 87 (out of 425 sectors) in 1997 to 47 in 2007.  The decline 
is more rapid for the restrictions than the prohibitions, which made up one-fifth of the total in 2007. 
The correlation across sectors between the different forms of protection is positive in 1997: We 
observe a partial correlation of 0.27 between NTB and FDI restrictions, 0.16 between NTBs and tariffs 
over 15%, but no correlation between FDI restrictions and high tariffs.  By 2007, however, the 
correlations between tariffs and either NTBs or FDI restrictions have become very weak and not 
statistically significant from zero, while the correlation between NTB and FDI has dropped to 0.1.  This 
behavior reflects the convergence of import tariffs to a fairly uniform level in all sectors and the 
dwindling importance of recorded NTBs.
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Figure 3 provides more information on the evolution of import tariffs over the 1995-2007 sample 
period.  Several patterns stand out.  First, output tariffs are on average substantially higher than input 
tariffs, reflecting the very different treatment of final goods from raw materials, intermediates inputs, and 
capital imports.  As a result, effective rates of protection (ERP) are considerably higher than the stated 
tariff rates.
6
  Second, tariff reduction has proceeded in two spurts, with large and widespread reductions 
between 1992 and 1997, and then again in 2002, with more heterogeneous and gradual reductions in the 
other years.  Tariff reductions became more predictable as negotiations proceeded, and after WTO entry 
followed a predetermined pattern.  Third, by the end of the period the average difference between input 
and output tariffs fell to less than four percentage points. Combined with the rising share of value added 
in total output, this narrowing contributes to a gradual reduction in the effective rate of protection.  
The average evolution hides important variation across industries that we use to identify the effects. 
The dashed lines, denoting the inter-quartile range for ERP, highlight that industries initially differed 
tremendously in the protection they received. The narrowing of the band, from approximately 20–120% 
in 1995 to 5–30% in 2007,  highlights the important tariff compression.  The experience of different 
sectors must have differed substantially.  
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 Here we use as weight the world trade volume at the 6-digit HS level from the UN Comtrade database. 
5
 The reductions in NTBs and output tariffs between 1997 and 2007 are orthogonal however, suggesting that there is 
some independent information in the two sets of changes. 
6
 In the Figure 3, note that that the left and right axis use different scales. 
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3. Literature, empirical model, and estimation 
3.1  Literature 
A large literature investigates the potential positive effects of broad-based tariff reductions on domestic 
industries.  One channel featured prominently in the early literature is the impact of foreign competition 
on price-cost margins.
7
  Studies using either accounting measures of the price-cost margin or an 
adaptation of the Hall methodology to parameterize the average mark-up as a function of trade 
protectionism systematically find evidence of downward pressure on these margins.  Roberts and Tybout 
(1996) contains studies for four developing countries that use accounting measures, while Levinsohn 
(1993), Harrison (1994), and Krishna and Mitra (1998) utilize the second methodology in studies for 
Turkey, Cote d’Ivoire, and India.  
The effect of trade liberalization can also work through size rationalization: Smaller firms are forced to 
exit and production at higher scale is more efficient.  Firm-level studies found support for this mechanism 
following the Canada-U.S. FTA (Head and Ries 1999; Baggs 2005), but not in Mexico (Tybout and 
Westbrook 1995).  In a recent study revisiting the Canadian experience, Baldwin and Gu (2008) find an 
effect on the size of production runs within plants, pointing to an important within-plant scale effect at the 
product level.  
These effects at the extensive margin are consistent with the heterogeneous firm model of Melitz 
(2003).  Each firm is assumed to operate with a constant level of productivity, but as trade barriers fall 
and foreign firms start selling in the domestic market, the minimum level of productivity that the marginal 
firm needs to break even rises.  In the context of Columbia’s trade liberalization experience, Eslava et al. 
(2004) show this mechanism is quantitatively important.  The reallocation of inputs and outputs is not 
limited to firm entry and exit however.  Hsieh and Klenow (2009) demonstrate that market distortions 
tend to be larger in developing countries like China or India than in the United States, resulting in a wider 
dispersion of productivity among active firms.  As competition increases following trade liberalization, 
the scope for productivity improvement through factor reallocation among active firms is likely to be 
larger in these countries.  
In these mechanisms, trade liberalization can improve aggregate productivity even without any change 
for individual firms.  To raise long-run productivity growth, firm-level changes are needed.  For example, 
stronger competition could force firms to improve technical or allocative efficiency.  Investment in new 
technology can achieve the same, but the loss of domestic market share to imports lowers investment 
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 Tybout (2003) reviews the theory and evidence behind this mechanism. 
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incentives and works in the opposite direction.  If trade liberalization is part of a bilateral agreement, 
increased market access in the trading partner’s economy could provide investment incentives, as in the 
Canada-U.S. FTA that Lileeva and Trefler (2010) study.  In a more open economy, firms must also satisfy 
more demanding clients, either overseas or locally (Javorcik, 2004). 
Goldberg et al. (2010) adopt a production structure from endogenous growth models that features a 
domestic production cost that declines in the number of imported input varieties.  When trade is 
liberalized and the range of imported products expands, the domestic industry endogenously raises its 
productivity and is able to introduce new products for export as well.  The Indian experience provides 
evidence for the importance of this mechanism.  Lower import tariffs on inputs are estimated to account 
for almost one-third of new product introductions, driven primarily by increased firm access to input 
varieties. 
To identify the effect of trade liberalization on productivity, most studies follow a two-step approach. 
In the first stage a productivity measure is constructed, which in the second stage is regressed on 
measures of trade liberalization.  The second stage regression can be run in levels, as in Pavcnik (2002) 
for Chile, but often firm-fixed effects are included or the equation is estimated in first differences.
 8
  
Trefler (2004) even uses double (time) differences to control for heterogeneity in baseline growth rates.  
Studies differ in the use of tariff rates or trade flows as measures of trade liberalization, in the way 
productivity is constructed, and in the extent to which they are able to control for demand side factors in 
the regression. Identification always comes from differences across industries in the extent of the 
liberalization, i.e. from different patterns of changes in protectionism across industries. 
Schor (2004) and Amiti and Konings (2007) follow a similar approach, studying the experience of 
Brazil and Indonesia, but they additionally include in the regression the level of tariff protection on a 
sector's intermediate inputs.  Both studies find that tariff reductions on inputs raise productivity more than 
tariff reductions on outputs.  They do not model the underlying mechanism, but the relative sizes of these 
effects are consistent with the Indian evidence and the endogenous growth model in Goldberg et al. 
(2010). Allowing for separate effects by productivity deciles, Schor (2004) further highlights that the 
positive effect of cuts in input tariffs on productivity are relatively constant across the productivity 
distribution.  Output tariff cuts, however, improve productivity at the bottom of the distribution, but 
diminish it at the top. 
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 Some other studies that follow the same basic set-up are Eslava, Haltiwanger, Kugler and Kugler (2004) and 
Fernandes (2007) for Colombia, and Sivadasan (2009) and Topalova and Khandelwal (2011) for India. 
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Heterogeneous effects of trade liberalization can be rationalized by a model of endogenous technology 
adoption, as in Ederington and McCalman (2009), which formalizes an earlier critique of Rodrik (1992). 
The decision of heterogeneous firms when to adopt productivity-enhancing technological improvements 
will depend crucially on their expected market share as the fixed costs of adoption need to be recovered. 
As trade liberalization raises the expected degree of competition and reduces expected market share, some 
firms will postpone adoption. Firms with characteristics that are related to fast technology adoption, most 
likely firms with a high productivity level, are likely to suffer most from trade liberalization: “An increase 
in tariff barriers should result in larger firms, exporting firms and younger firms having higher 
productivity growth.” (Ederington and McCalman, 2009, p. 18)   They find support for these predictions 
in the case of Colombia, but recall that the evidence for Brazil in Schor (2004) pointed in the opposite 
direction. 
3.2  Empirical specification 
In light of the previous discussion, we estimate equations of the form: 
ΔklnX(i)st  =  lnX(i)st – lnX(i)st-k  =  β1 Tst-k + β2 Δ
k
Tst + αt  + ε(i)st .          (1) 
The specification can represent a firm-level (i) regression or one at the industry level (s), in which case 
the optional i subscript is omitted.  We will use several dependent variables, namely, trade flows, price 
indices, productivity growth, and the individual terms in a linear decomposition of sectoral productivity 
growth.  These regressions can also be estimated in levels with firm or industry-fixed effects included, 
which lead to very similar results. 
The key explanatory variable is the level of trade protectionism (T) which is measured using either 
the import tariff or the effective rate of protection (ERP).  The effective rate of protection tends to be 
higher, as tariffs are generally lower for inputs than for final goods (see Figure 3), and has declined more 
over the sample period.  We include both the lagged level of protectionism and the first difference.  The 
first variable informs us to what extent the variation of the dependent variable across sectors is associated 
with initial rates of protection, while the second variable captures the association between tariff declines 
and changes in the dependent variable, controlling for the initial rate of protectionism and an unobserved 
but constant year effect.  The same time lag k is used for both variables.  
The interpretation of β2 as the causal effect of, for example, tariff reduction on productivity growth, 
depends on the exogeneity of the policy change.  An unexpected and broad-based implementation, as in 
the case of the Canada-U.S. FTA, would be helpful in this regard.  Trefler (2004) argues that tariff cuts 
affecting all sectors were announced suddenly and applied quickly thereafter, leaving individual 
industries little time to lobby for exemptions or preferential treatment.  An additional element in his study 
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is the use of double-time differences to control for initial heterogeneity in growth rates and sole focus on  
a correlation between tariff cuts and the change in productivity growth.  The industry or firm-fixed effects 
already absorb heterogeneous but constant factors that are correlated with the reduction in protectionism.   
Fernandes (2007) relies on this in her analysis for Colombia.  She also uses lagged tariff changes, as these 
are less likely to be correlated with contemporary productivity shocks.   
Several researchers rely on instruments for tariffs that are unlikely to be correlated with productivity 
changes. Trefler (2004) uses the share of unskilled labor in total employment as a proxy for the likelihood 
that a sector organizes itself and tries to block tariff liberalization.  Amiti and Konings (2007) use the 
initial tariff level as an instrument for the change in tariffs. The underlying assumption is that policy-
makers did not discriminate between sectors and lowered tariff protection to the same level for each 
sector. Thus, the change in tariff reduction is explained entirely by the initial situation, not by policy 
discretion.  Topalova (2007) makes a similar argument in her study of poverty and inequality in India. 
3.3  Endogeneity of tariff reductions 
This last argument also fits the Chinese situation rather well.  In Figure 4  we plot the change in import 
tariffs on the vertical axis against the initial level of protection on the horizontal axis. The top panel 
shows the change between 1992 and 2007, which covers the full period of China’s trade liberalization. 
The dispersion of protection across sectors is extremely wide in 1992, with nine sectors receiving 
protection of more than 100 percent. By 2007, only a single industry had an import tariff above 40 percent 
and only nine exceeded the 25 percent threshold. As a result, the relationship between tariff reduction and 




The results suggest that over the full period there was very little policy discretion in the extent of trade 
liberalization in each sector.  The average import tariff declined from 43.8 to 9.9 percent between 1992 
and 2007, but equally remarkable was the decline in standard deviation across sectors from 28.0 to 7.0 
percent over the same period.
10
  Moreover, the partial correlation between tariff rates in these two years is 
extremely high at 0.70.  The dispersion in 2007 is well explained by the initial dispersion, suggesting that 
the decline was almost entirely proportional.  The only flexibility left for policy makers was the timing of 
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 The solid line on the graph represents a simple linear regression of the change on the level; it has a slope of -0.84 
and R-squared of 0.96. 
10
 Another indicator of the lack of dispersion in 2007 is that half of the sectors received an import tariff between 
5.3% and 13.5%, for an inter-quartile range of only 8.2%; the corresponding range in 1992 was 40%. 
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when exactly to reduce a particular sector’s tariff rate and the lagged rate of protection is included in the 
regression to control for the existing degree of protection in a sector when its rates came down. 
The bottom panel of Figure 4 indicates that there is more heterogeneity in the extent of tariff 
reductions in the post-WTO period (2001–2007).  For example, the observations above the solid 
regression line on the right of the graph are sectors with relatively high tariff rates at the eve of WTO 
accession that experience below average tariff declines.  This leaves some scope for policy endogeneity, 
but only in an expectational sense as tariff cuts after 2001 are already fixed in the accession agreement.  
Policy makers can only tailor the cuts for specific sectors to satisfactory productivity performance insofar 
as performance could be predicted when the agreement was being negotiated.  It is not the dependency of 
policy on unobservables that one usually worries about. 
Results in Table 1 for regressions of tariff levels on industry characteristics in three separate years are 
consistent with the above description of the liberalization process. The estimates in column (1) for 1995—
the earliest years for which such regressions are possible--indicate that tariffs were significantly lower for 
sectors producing intermediate and capital goods and for sectors that are more capital or skill intensive in 
the United States.  This is consistent with a desire to force firms in crucial sectors for industrial 
development to improve by exposing them to more foreign competition.
11
  Sectors with high levels 
employment, especially of less educated workers, and more concentrated sectors also enjoyed higher 
tariffs.  The importance of a these China-specific characteristics before 1995 likely reflects political 
economy considerations.   
The corresponding estimates for tariffs in 2001 and 2007, reported in columns (2) and (3), are by and 
large consistent with an across-the-board and indiscriminate lowering of all tariff rates.  With only a 
single exception, coefficients all become smaller in absolute value and less statistically significant.  By 
2007, none of the China-specific industry characteristics (at the bottom) are significant predictors of tariff 
rates. The only two variables that are still statistically significant are product complexity (positively) and 
skill intensity (negatively). The fit of the regression also declines markedly. 
 Finally, we investigate whether the variation in import tariff reductions illustrated in Figure 4 is 
related to initial productivity levels, as would be the case if policymakers concentrate tariff cuts in sectors 
they expect to be able to withstand foreign competition.  Following Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), we 
run industry-level regressions of various measures of current protection on lagged levels of productivity.  
We perform this analysis separately for the pre and post-WTO period and use one or two-year lags. Table 
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 Duty free imports of capital goods and intermediates in the export processing sector may have also required lower 
tariffs on these goods to prevent their diversion from export processing to the rest of the economy. 
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2 contains the coefficients on lagged productivity (TFP).  In the pre-WTO period, the coefficients are not 
statistically significant and even positive in the regressions for tariffs and ERPs.  As such, any association 
between tariff reductions and subsequent productivity gains is unlikely to be the result of reverse 
causality.  The relationship between lagged TFP and NTBs or FDI restrictions is negative, however, 
implying that these measures are more likely to be found in sectors with low productivity and suggesting 
a more selective use.  The regressions for the post-WTO period indicate more broadly that protection is 
lower for sectors that had higher productivity levels one or two years earlier.  
Policy endogeneity can thus not be totally ruled out in the post-WTO period, but as mentioned before 
this was only possible on an ex-ante basis, i.e. based on the expected performance of the sectors.  There is 
some anecdotal evidence that the policy-setting process over commitments to reduce tariffs and NTBs 
with entry into the WTO became more politicized and subject to lobbying as negotiations progressed to 
more contentious sectors.  The inclusion of lagged levels of protection in all regressions will absorb some 
of these effects.  In addition, we will be more careful to assign causal interpretations to post-WTO results. 
4. Data 
We use annual data for 1995 and 1998-2007 for all state-owned industrial firms and non-state owned 
firms with sales above 5 million RMB.  The information is collected through annual surveys by China’s 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and discussed in detail in Brandt et al. (2012).  Aggregates for 
employment, sales, capital, and exports for these firms match almost perfectly the totals reported annually 
in the China Statistical Yearbook. Compared to the universe of firms observed in the 2004 Economic 
Census, our sample of “above-scale” industrial firms represents the bulk of industrial activity in China.  In 
2004, they accounted for 91 percent of the gross output, 71 percent of employment, 97 percent of exports, 
and 91 percent of total fixed assets.  For the analysis in the paper, we focus on manufacturing firms with 
more than eight workers.
12
 
A change in the firm IDs in 1998 makes it impossible to link observations in 1995 with the later years, 
but the data for 1995 are included in the industry-level analysis.  For the period between 1998 and 2007, 
we observe an unbalanced panel that increases from 145,511 firms in 1998 to 311,323 in 2007.  As firm 
identifiers often changed due to restructuring or M&A activity, we supplement the firm IDs with 
information on the firm’s name, sector, and address to establish links over time.  Only four percent of the 
links rely on this additional information, but one-sixth of the firms that are observed for more than one 
year experience a change in their official ID at some point in the sample period.  To account for changes 
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 We drop the few firms with fewer than eight employees as they fall under a different legal regime. 
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in the Chinese Industry Classification (CIC) codes in 2003, some industries are merged to obtain a 
consistent classification over the entire sample period. 
The dependent variable in much of the analysis is productivity growth for industry s, calculated as  
ΔlnPst ≡ ΔlnYst  −    ̅ ΔlnLst  – (1 –   ̅) ΔlnKst .              (2) 
The right hand side represents the difference between output growth and the share-weighted growth in 
inputs, where    ̅  the industry-specific average wage share in output in the two years over which the 
growth rate is calculated, used as the weight for labor.  One minus this share is used for capital.
13
  One 
and two-year differences are used.  Real value-added is constructed by double-deflating gross output and 
material inputs using the appropriate deflators: the official two-digit output price deflator and an 
aggregation of the same series using a vector of input shares for each industry from the 2002 Input-Output 
table as weights.  In robustness checks using a gross output production function, material input is added to 
equation (2) in the same way as labor input and gross output is used instead of value added in the first 
term.  Similar calculations at the firm level produce the index-number productivity measure used in 
Brandt et al. (2012).  The factor shares are now the firm-specific averages over the two years.  In 
robustness checks, we use parametric productivity estimates that rely on the proxy-estimator from Olley 
and Pakes (1996). 
In the empirical analysis, we utilize information on a firm’s registered type (qiye dengji zhuce leixing) 
to construct ownership categories.  We group firms into four categories: state, hybrid (township & village 
enterprises, local government owned, etc.), private, and foreign, which includes subsidiaries of firms from 
Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwan (HMT).
14
  
We also use information on import volumes at the industry level.  These data are aggregated up from a 
data set containing the universe of firm-level trade transactions covering the 2000-2006 period—Manova 
and Zhang (2012) provide extensive details on the data set.
 15
  In principle, we could use information from 
UN Comtrade to conduct an analysis over a longer time period, but these data do not enable us to 
distinguish between export processing and ordinary trade.  Given that the large fraction of trade entering 
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 Labor is measured as total employment and the real capital stock series is constructed using the same algorithm as 
in Brandt et al. (2012). Employee compensation consists of wages and from 2003 onwards also supplementary 
benefits. These measures of compensation likely underestimate total payments to labor. Labor’s share of value 
added averages only 32.4 percent in our sample, while the national income accounts suggest an overall share of 
labor of around 50 percent. The correct share for manufacturing is likely to be intermediate and in Brandt et al. 
(2012) we experimented with adjustment factors. 
14
 When ownership is mixed, we use the following order of priority to categorize firms: foreign, state, hybrid, private. 
15
 This uses the same HS-CIC correspondence table discussed in footnote 3. 
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the country under the trade processing regime is exempt from import duties, it is important to identify 
imports flows that are actually subject to import tariffs.
 
 
The source and construction of the different measures of protection—import tariff rates, non-tariff 
barriers, and FDI restrictions—was already discussed in Section 2.2.  
5. Effects of tariff reductions 
5.1  Import volumes 
The first place we expect to find evidence for an effect of import tariff reductions on the domestic 
economy is in the import flows.  We use the annual growth in imports for 4-digit CIC industries as the 
dependent variable in equation (1) and report the estimates over the 2000-2006 period in Table 3.  Note 
that over this period, total imports of manufactured goods increased by a factor of three and a half.  The 
coefficient in column (1) for total imports is –1.53 implying that a one percentage point reduction in 
(output) tariff is associated with an increase in imports in the same sector of 1.53 percent.  If one believes 
that China is a price taker on world markets, this elasticity is rather small.  The low precision of the 
estimate is especially noteworthy: Despite substantial variation in the explanatory variable and a sample 
size of 2,442 observations, the coefficient is not even statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
16
  
One possible explanation for the small and insignificant estimate is the duty-free entry of a sizable 
portion of imports, most notably under the processing trade regime.  In the next two columns of Table 3, 
we disaggregate imports and report results separately for ordinary trade and “processing trade” imports.  
As expected, the elasticity is larger for ordinary trade, 1.95 against 0.45 for processing trade, but both of 
the estimates are still not statistically significant.  A delay in the import response to tariff cuts could be a 
possible explanation, but the results in column (4) that relate two-year import growth rates to tariff cuts 
over the same two-year period are virtually identical.  Industries with higher initial tariff levels have 
lower import growth, significant at the 10 percent level, but reductions in tariffs are only weakly related 
to higher imports, even over a two-year period.
17
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 We have run the same regressions using as units of observation the much more detailed 6 or 8-digit HS 
classification of goods which requires less or no aggregation of tariff rates. The results are qualitatively similar.  The 
point estimates are larger, but still not significantly different from zero.  For consistency with the results in the paper 
using other dependent variables, we report the industry-level results in Table 3. 
17
 Looking for different trade responses by Broad Economic Categories (BEC) of goods revealed small, but 
insignificant differences with the trade response largest for materials and unprocessed intermediate inputs. 
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 To examine import behavior at the firm level, we matched  the detailed trade transactions in the 
customs records to the firm-level sample.
18
   We use the BEC system to identify imports that are 
unprocessed or processed intermediate goods (categories 22, 42, and 53) or materials (categories 21 and 
31) to obtain a firm-level estimate of intermediate inputs that are imported (directly).  We use this 
information in two ways: first, to estimate the fraction of manufacturing firms that use imported inputs, 
and second, to calculate the share of raw materials and intermediate inputs reported in the firm-level data 
that consist of imports.  
Descriptive statistics in Table 4 illustrate that the importance of intermediates that are imported 
directly by Chinese manufacturing firms remains rather low, despite the huge increase in total imports in 
the economy.  The percentage of firms that directly import any intermediates or materials increased only 
slightly from 11.2 percent in 2000 to 12.9 percent in 2006.  The increase in the share of intermediates that 
are imported is also modest, increasing from 7.8 percent of total input use in 2000 to 9.4 percent in 2006.  
Almost the entire increase in the participation rate comes from ordinary trade, consistent with the 
diminished advantage of duty-free imports under the export processing regime. Still, imported 
intermediates that enter as ordinary trade remain less than half as important as duty-free imports. 
These estimates conceal huge differences across ownership types that stay relatively constant over this 
period.  More than half of all foreign firms in the sample directly import intermediates in 2006, compared 
to only 3 percent of private firms, and 4 percent of SOEs.  On average, almost twenty percent of all inputs 
used by foreign firms were directly imported; for domestic firms it was less than one percent.  
Regressions similar to those reported in Table 3 but at the firm level and with imported intermediates as 
dependent variable (not reported) reveal that private and foreign firms which are only engaged in ordinary 
trade are the most responsive to import tariff cuts. However, in 2006, the last year for which we observe 
the detailed information, these imports represented only 0.7 percent of their total input use. 
In summary, the significant tariff reductions only have a limited impact on trade flows.  Rapid growth 
in domestic Chinese manufacturing production leads to much higher imports of raw materials, 
intermediates and capital goods, but the increase is only weakly related to reductions in protection.  This 
is in sharp contrast to the large effects documented for India in Goldberg et al. (2010). Any effect of trade 
                                                 
18 In 2006, approximately two-thirds of total imports by value are accounted for. The balance is imports by firms 
that could not be matched, notably, trading firms that act as agents for firms importing indirectly and by non-
manufacturing firms such as retailers.  Over time, the role of trading companies declined as more firms obtained 
direct trading rights.  As a result, the statistics in Table 4 are likely to overestimate the increases in either the 




liberalization on Chinese firms does not seem to run through a loss of market share to importers, which 
often features prominently in theory models. 
5.2  Price levels and price-cost margins 
Limit pricing by domestic Chinese firms provides one possible explanation for the muted response of 
trade flows to tariff reductions.  The work of Salvo (2010) on the Brazilian cement industry illustrates this 
can be an effective competitive response to trade liberalization.  Rather than share the domestic market 
with imported products, domestic firms lower their prices to keep imports at bay.  The adjustment to a 
tariff cut shifts from the quantity to the price dimension. 
We again use equation (1), but now with the change in the domestic output deflator as dependent 
variable.  The Chinese National Bureau of Statistics calculates an output deflator at the 2-digit CIC level 
for the entire sample period (1995-2007).  Brandt et al. (2012) calculate a more detailed 4-digit price 
deflator, but this is only available through 2005 period, and we use the more aggregate series to extend it 
to the end of the sample period. To facilitate interpretation of the point estimates we express the price 
changes in the dependent variable in percentage point reductions.   
Results in Table 5 suggest that the effect of tariff cuts on domestic prices is both large and estimated 
very precisely.  The two alternatives deflators give similar results: a one percentage point decline in a 
sector’s tariff rate reduces the annual price deflator by 0.23 to 0.30 percentage points.  Over a two year 
period, responses are larger, especially for the more disaggregate series, with an estimate of 0.49.  The 
estimation precision is slightly higher for the more disaggregate series, but in both cases the difference 
with the results for import volumes in Table 3 is pronounced.  The t-statistics are four times higher and all 
estimates are easily statistically significant at the 1% level. 
In the next two columns of Table 5 we regress the change in the input price deflator on the input tariff 
reductions.  These variables are calculated by pre-multiplying the vector of output prices or tariff rates by 
the Chinese Input-Output matrix.  Both input series are thus a weighted average of the corresponding 
output series using the sectoral input shares as weights.  The regressions again produce positive and 
highly significant point estimates, but they are much higher than for output prices suggesting that the 
weighing matters greatly.  If tariff reductions were passed on completely and prices of domestically 
produced inputs did not adjust, the point estimate should equal the share of imported intermediates in total 
inputs, approximately 0.10.  However, the point estimates are much higher and for the disaggregate series 
near unity.  Reductions in input tariffs show up one-for-one in the input price deflator that covers both 
domestically produced and imported intermediates.  Price competition for intermediate inputs seems to be 
very fierce, as domestic producers must have responded strongly to the trade liberalization. For output 
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prices, the point estimates also exceed the import penetration, but the difference is less pronounced.  
Domestically produced and imported final goods often compete in different market segments which 
shelters domestic firms somewhat from the import competition.  
To investigate how these effects on domestic prices translate into changes in firms’ price-cost margins 
we adopt the framework of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012).  They exploit the fact that cost-
minimizing firms will equate the output elasticity of each variable input to the revenue share of that input, 
adjusted for the marginal production cost.  This holds locally for any production function and demand 
system, but for a Cobb-Douglas production function it implies that the optimal price-cost margin for each 
firm has to equal αL/sL, the ratio of the output elasticity with respect to labor and the wage share in 
revenue.  If the production technology is constant over time, the negative of the change in the wage share 
in revenue (      ) is a direct measure of the change in the logarithm of the price-cost margin.  
In panel (d) of Table 5 we present estimates using this expression as the dependent variable in 
regression (1) and the change in trade protection (ERP) as the explanatory variable.  The results indicate 
that price-cost margins decline most appreciably in sectors where trade protection is reduced the most.  
Year-fixed effects explain some, but not all of the effects.  The underlying variation in the data that 
identifies these effects is that firms increase payments to labor as a percentage of total revenue in sectors 
where tariffs come down.  In the framework of De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) the interpretation is 
that initially a fraction of the marginal product of labor is appropriated by the firm as profits.  With trade 
liberalization and reduced market power, prices will be lower at each output level and the share of 
revenue that goes to labor increases.  In the limit, for perfect competition, this share should converge to 
the output elasticity of labor in the production function. The estimates are intuitive and consistent with the 
direct evidence on price levels, but the effects are not estimated very precisely. 
5.3  Productivity growth at the firm level 
The previous results suggest that Chinese firms responded to trade liberalization by aggressively lowering 
domestic prices and conceding only little market share to imports.  In the short run, this can be achieved 
by lowering price-cost margins, but this kind of strategy is only sustainable in the long run if productivity 
can be increased.  Can the increase in TFP documented at the outset of the paper be linked to tariff 
reductions? 
Our starting point is a firm-level version of equation (1) with firm productivity growth as dependent 
variable.  We again add the lagged level of tariff protection as control.  In the first four columns of Table 
6, we report the effect of changes over one or two years, where changes are annualized and thus directly 
comparable. We run separate regressions for the full sample of firms, and for a balanced panel of firms 
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that remain in operation throughout the entire period.
19
  In columns 5-8, we report the results for 
corresponding regressions in levels that include both firm and time-fixed effects.  Finally, in columns 9-
12 and 13-16, we report results for the pre and post-WTO periods separately. 
Several patterns are noteworthy.  First, over the entire period, tariff reduction is strongly associated 
with a significant increase in firm-level productivity growth.  Second, the effects are appreciably larger 
for the full sample of firms than for the balance sample.  TFP growth of new entrants or exiting firms is 
apparently more closely related to tariffs than it is for incumbents.  Third, estimating the effects in level 
with firm (and time) fixed effects produces a smaller estimate of the impact of tariff reduction, albeit still 
highly significant.  Fourth, the elasticity of productivity with tariff liberalization appears to be 
substantially larger in the post-WTO period.  As discussed earlier, this could partially be the result of 
policy endogeneity based on expected future performance.   
To put the magnitudes in context, the effective rate of protection fell sixty percentage points over the 
full period.  A coefficient on ΔERP of -0.239 then implies that a total improvement in TFP of nearly 15 
percent can be linked to the trade liberalization.  This converts to a one percent permanent increase in 
TFP per year, or one-eighth of firm-level TFP growth.  For firms in the balanced panel, the contribution is 
slightly smaller.  As suggested by Figure 3, differences in the reductions in the ERP across sectors are 
even larger, for example, for industry in the 20
th
 percentile, the ERP rose 5 percent, while for those in the 
80
th 
percentile it fell 110 percent. This translates into a permanent annual difference in TFP growth of two 
percent.  
These effects are respectable, but not that large in comparison to the overall TFP growth for 
manufacturing that we document at the outset of the paper, or the dispersion in rates across sectors.  There 
are other channels though for tariff liberalization to influence productivity growth in China.  In addition to 
TFP improvements for continuing firms, there are two other potentially important margins: Entry and exit 
or improvements resulting from the reallocation of inputs to more productive firms.  We evaluate the 
importance of these two channels in an analysis at the industry level.  
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 In the "all firms" sample we still omit year-on-year changes that would include the year of entry or the last year of 
operations prior to exit.  This is to avoid inappropriate comparisons where a firm might not have been operating for 
the entire year and "stock" measures of inputs do not correspond well to "flow" levels of output. We do not omit the 
first and last year-on-year changes for the balanced panels as there are no comparable concerns. As a result, the 
sample is the same for the regressions in changes and levels for the “all firms” sample, but not for the “balanced 




5.4  Productivity growth at the industry level 
We now estimate equation (1) using industry-level productivity growth for the 424 sectors as dependent 
variable.  The interpretation of the results in Table 7 is comparable to those in Table 6.  
In the first column of Table 7, we report the effect of one-year changes in tariff protection estimated 
over the full period.  The coefficient of -0.584 implies that a ten percentage point reduction in ERP leads 
to a permanent six percent improvement in industry-level productivity.  On the basis of column (8), a 
tariff reduction spread over two years is estimated to require a reduction in ERP of fifteen percentage 
points to have the same effect.  The coefficient on lagged productivity in column (1) is also negative and 
statistically significant, a result that is robust in all specifications in Table 7.  Industries that initially enjoy 
stronger protection tend to experience lower rates of total factor productivity growth.  We hesitate to give 
this a causal interpretation as the earlier results in Table 1 suggest that the initial distribution of protection 
was not random. Controlling for these effects however, we find that a reduction in tariff rates to the same 
low levels in all sectors leads to the most pronounced productivity effects in sectors where the decline in 
ERP is most pronounced.  
Results in columns (3) and (5) illustrate that the effects become slightly stronger over time, but the 
elasticity of -0.505 for the pre-WTO period (1995-2002) is only a quarter below the -0.673 estimate for 
the period after China joined the WTO (2002-2007).  Several factors may help to explain the more 
pronounced effect including deeper integration with the international economy, elimination of some of the 
NTBs because of WTO, as well as the development of trade infrastructure, both in terms of hardware and 
institutions.  Tariff declines also became more predictable once China joined the WTO and productivity 
responses may have become more rapid as a result.  Of course, as suggested by Figure 4, we cannot 
totally rule out some forward-looking policy endogeneity. 
In columns (2), (4), and (6), we examine the combined effects on TFP of the use of non-tariff barriers 
together with tariffs.
20
  We include a dummy variable that measures the presence of any NTBs in an 
industry in the original specification in a way analogous to tariffs, i.e. adding both lags and changes, and 
also include all interactions between the two policy instruments.  The coefficients on the changes in tariff 
protection are rather robust to this change and increase only slightly in absolute value.  The coefficients 
on the NTBs all tend to be insignificant, with one key exception.  The interaction of the change in the 
effective rate of protection with lagged NTBs is always positive, large, and estimated to be highly 
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 We also examined the effects of restrictions on FDI, but the coefficients were small and insignificant.  Most of the 
changes for FDI occurred in a single year (2002), making the effect difficult to discern from the substantial tariff 
declines occurring in the same year. 
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significant.  This suggests that the presence of NTBs in a sector neutralizes most of the impact of a tariff 
reduction: The baseline effect of -0.610 is reduced to one-third of its size (the coefficient on the 
interaction term is 0.411).  This ability to counteract the effects of tariff reduction was especially 
pronounced in the post-WTO period—the interaction coefficient is 0.890 compared to 0.324 pre-WTO—
but of course, NTBs were much less frequently used as time progresses.   
In the bottom panel of Table 7 we report the results for various robustness checks.  The lower effect 
for two-year changes in column (8) has already been mentioned.  Estimating the equation in levels with 
industry-fixed effects, as in Amiti and Konings (2007), lowers the elasticity with respect to changes in 
ERP, as was the case for the firm-level estimates.  Using industry-fixed effects in addition to time-
differencing—analogous to the double time-differencing of Trefler (2004)—results in slightly larger 
effects of trade liberalization on productivity growth. Using labor productivity as dependent variable, in 
column (11), gives nearly identical results, and suggests that differences between sectors in capital 
accumulation are orthogonal to the trade liberalization.  Finally, the elasticity is estimated to be five times 
smaller using a gross-output based measure of TFP, in column (12), which is lower than the 3:1 ratio of 
the relative growth rates for the two TFP measures, estimated in Brandt et al. (2012). 
One thing that stands out is that the coefficients estimated at the industry level in Table 7 are 
significantly larger than the estimates at the firm level in Table 6.  The increase in absolute magnitude is 
most pronounced in the pre-WTO period.  This relationship suggests that channels other than firm-level 
changes were important for the full impact of tariff liberalization, which we now investigate. 
5.5  Decomposing the industry-level effects  
There are several potential explanations for the strong relationship between tariff reductions and 
productivity growth.  The channel envisioned by some Chinese leaders is that it reflects the causal effect 
of productivity-enhancing restructuring, which would be consistent with the higher estimates at the 
industry level compared to the firm level.  We explore the importance of alternative channels by linearly 
decomposing sectoral productivity growth and then using each term in the decomposition as the 
dependent variable in separate regressions of the form of (1).  
The decomposition we use is exact for the growth in sectoral productivity if we define the aggregate 
level (lnPt) as the weighted aggregate of the firm-level log-productivity levels (lnPit): 
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We end up with four terms, each of which has an intuitive interpretation.  The first term captures the 
contribution of firm-level productivity growth to the industry average, the ‘within’ term.  The second one 
captures the productivity effects of changes in the firm-weights, the ‘between’ term, and is associated 
with the reallocation of resources among firms. This effect can be positive if market shares move to a firm 
with above-average productivity or negative if the reverse happens. We follow Griliches and Regev 
(1995) and use the average values over the two periods—for the firm share or productivity—to weight the 
differences in order to avoid the introduction of an additional term that interacts the changes in shares and 
productivity.
21
  The last two terms contain the effect of net entry on aggregate productivity. We follow 
Haltiwanger (1997) and normalize all productivity levels by the lagged aggregate productivity level to 
take into account that unbalanced panels can have different weights for entering and exiting firms.  As a 
result, the contribution of net entry will be positive if entering firms tend to perform better relative to the 
lagged aggregate than exiting firms. 
We are not interested in the contribution of each term to aggregate productivity growth per se—Brandt 
et al. (2012) already establishes that the extensive margin of firm restructuring through entry and exit was 
extremely important.  Rather, we perform the above decomposition for each sector and then investigate 
using equation (1) which term has the strongest correlation with the reduction in ERP.  As we need to 
follow individual firms over time, we can only conduct this analysis from 1998 onwards.  To identify 
correctly the extent of tariff reduction that each firm is exposed to, we only include surviving firms that 
remain in the same sector throughout.  In contrast with the previous analyses, only the first and last year 
of each period are used to construct each term, not the intervening years.  The relationship between the 
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 Petrin and Levinsohn (2012) demonstrate that such a term tends to be very volatile and the interpretation is not 
obvious. Using the average share or productivity level as weight in the within and between terms splits the 
contribution of the interaction term equally over the first two terms.  Petrin and Levinsohn (2012) further argue that 
the between term only contributes to a welfare-consistent measure of technological change if there are frictions that 
prevent the efficient allocation of resources.  The evidence in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) suggests this is not an 
unnatural assumption for China. 
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aggregate productivity growth and the tariff cuts over the entire period is in column (1) of Table 8.  The 
estimate of -0.610 is very similar to the estimate using all annual changes in Table 7 (-0.584).
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Because of the linear regression and linear decomposition, the estimates of the four terms in columns 
(2) to (5) aggregate exactly to the overall effect.  In the first panel for the full sample period, the effect 
from the entry channel is by far the most important and accounts for the entire industry-wide effect.  The 
positive contribution of the within term (negative point estimate) is cancelled out by small, but opposite 
effects from the between and exit terms.  This is not entirely surprising as an enormous share of the 
aggregate output in 2007 is accounted for by firms that enter in the nine year period between 1998 and 
2007.  The stark contrast between the strong correlation with the reduction in trade protection for the 
entry term and the almost total lack of relationship for the other terms is remarkable.  Trade liberalization 
strongly increases the productivity contribution of firm-churning at the extensive margin.  Sectors that 
experience the largest tariff cuts are characterized by far greater productivity differences between entering 
and exiting firms. 
Over the shorter sub-periods before and after WTO entry, the total contribution of net entry to 
productivity growth will be less important by construction, but the strength of the correlation with tariff 
cuts could go either way.  The estimate in column (14) is almost identical to that in column (4) 
highlighting that the relationship between the entry-contribution and tariff cuts is equally strong after 
China joined the WTO and estimated just as precisely.  This is especially remarkable given that the 
variation in the dependent and explanatory variable is far lower in the later period.  The fact that tariff 
reductions have become more predictable and irreversible, and that firms thus could anticipate and 
prepare for the changes is likely to strengthen the relationship. 
In the period prior to WTO entry, the productivity contribution from entry is only weakly associated 
with tariff reductions, and largely offset by the opposite, and significant, effect through exit.  With the 
overall effect of net entry channel small, the “within” term is responsible for almost the full correlation 
between industry-level productivity growth and tariff cuts.  Note that the estimate of -0.173 in column (7) 
is far larger than the earlier firm-level estimate, column (9) in Table 6, even though it measures the same 
effect.  The difference is the weights in the within term, suggesting that the larger surviving firms are far 
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  A comparison of the results in Tables 6, 7 and 8 reveals effects similar in magnitude at the firm and industry level 
for the full period and for the post-WTO period, but much less so than for the pre-WTO period. The pre-WTO 
coefficients are also typically smaller, but the differences are much less than meets the eye.  Note that in Table 6, as 
we move from the balanced to the full panel the increase in the coefficient on the change in ERP from -.053 to -.093. 
It more than doubles in Table 8 to -.228 when we calculate the industry level aggregate by output-weighting the 
micro-level estimates.  Finally, in Table 7, it is almost as large at the post-WTO period when we aggregate inputs 
and outputs before calculating TFP, and extend the pre-WTO period backwards to 1995. 
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more likely to experience strong productivity growth in sectors that were liberalized.  Note that the 
estimated effects for the within term are remarkably similar in the two periods.
23
  This suggests that the 
pressure on firms to improve their productivity growth when faced with lower tariff protection has been 
more persistent than the pressure operating through the net entry channel.    
The insignificant coefficient estimates for the between terms in all periods indicate that market share 
changes were not correlated with tariff cuts.  Over the full period, see column (3), the weak positive 
estimate even suggests that the increase in market share of highly productive firms is less likely or at least 
less important in sectors that liberalized most.  The positive coefficients for the (–) exit term are also 
rather low, but they suggest that exit of highly unproductive firms is a less important contributor to 
aggregate TFP growth in sectors that liberalized most. 
The most important pattern in Table 8 is the strong correlation between tariff cuts and the contribution 
of new entrants to industry TFP.  This contribution is a combination of the entrants’ output share and their 
productivity premium over the previous period’s average.  More than four-fifths of all firms active in 
2007, accounting for approximately two thirds of aggregate output, entered between 1998 and 2007.  The 
breakdown across ownership categories of new entrants differs considerably from the composition of 
incumbents in 1998.   At the end of the sample period, private firms accounted for one-third of aggregate 
output and half of all active firms.  Moreover, 92% of private firms were new entrants, who produced 
85% of private firm output.  In contrast, the market share of SOEs was comparable in 1998 and 2007, but 
almost half of SOE output in 2007 was produced by firms already in operation in 1998.  Regressions (not 
reported) show that private firm entry is very high across all sectors, but the sectoral composition is not 
related to the tariff reductions.  We next investigate where new firms enter in the productivity distribution 
to verify whether the quality of entrants is related to trade liberalization. 
5.6  Position of different types of firms in the productivity distribution 
To investigate the relationship between trade protection and the relative productivity of new entrants and 
exiting firms, we estimate the following regression: 
                 ∑          
          ∑          
           .      (3) 
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 The large estimate on the lagged ERP variable in column (12) indicates that sectors that were still heavily 
protected in 2002 did not enjoy strong productivity growth in the following years. If policy-makers could have 
anticipated some of this and conditioned future tariff cuts on it, some of the post-WTO effects could be due to 
reverse causality.  
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The dependent variable is now the level of productivity and the explanatory variables are a set of firm-
type characteristics that are included additively and interacted with the degree of tariff protection in each 
sector. 
We use the contemporaneous ERP variable (k = 0) in the first two columns of Table 9 and one-year 
lagged ERP in the next two columns.  In the first and third columns, we use only three dummy variables 
to define firm-types: entrants, exiting firms, and incumbents.  There are three noteworthy findings.  First, 
entrants have higher and exiting firms lower levels of productivity than incumbents, confirming the 
results in Brandt et al. (2012).
24
  Second, each of the three types of firms tends to have relatively lower 
productivity levels in sectors that receive strong trade protection.  Third, the link between productivity 
and tariffs is a lot less pronounced when lagged protection is used. 
Results in the second and fourth column further distinguish between four ownership categories: state-
owned firms (SOE), hybrid firms with mixed ownership, private firms, and foreign-owned firms.  In total, 
effects now vary across twelve different firm types (SOE-entrants, etc.).  The earlier results survive and 
become even more pronounced.  The non-interacted ownership variables indicate that SOEs (the omitted 
category) tend to have far lower levels of productivity on average, confirming results from several earlier 
studies.  The triple interactions between ownership, activity status, and degree of protection are even more 
revealing, and identify similar patterns for hybrid, private, and foreign firms, but very different ones for 
SOEs. 
For the first three ownership types, tariff rates are not systematically related to the productivity level of 
incumbents.  While firms that are about to exit have on average significantly lower productivity, this 
selection on productivity is significantly dampened in highly protected sectors.  When tariff rates are 
sufficiently high, the negative correlation between exit and productivity disappears entirely.  The 
association between low productivity levels and exit is stronger in unprotected sectors and is particularly 
pronounced for private firms.  Similarly, the superior productivity level of new entrants is a unique 
feature of open, unprotected sectors.  When import tariffs are sufficiently high in a sector, unproductive 
firms are as likely to enter.  Low trade protection heightens the association between productivity and 
entry or exit, indicative of stronger market selection.  In open sectors, entrants are more productive than 
incumbents, and exiting firms less.  In protected sectors, the productivity differences between entrants and 
exiting firms are less systematic.  This mechanism is consistent with the close link between tariff rates 
                                                 
24
 As in the case of the other firm-level regressions in Table 6, we drop the first full year of entry and the last year 
before exit to make sure we do not use partial years of activity. 
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and the contribution of the entry-term to aggregate productivity which we illustrated in the previous 
section. 
The patterns are radically different for one type of firms: SOEs have lower productivity levels than the 
other ownership types on average, but this is especially true for incumbent SOEs in highly protected 
sectors and for exiting SOEs in the same sectors.  In contrast, the few new SOEs that enter the sample do 
not enter with higher productivity in more open sectors, as was the case for private or foreign firms.  
Their productivity level is entirely unrelated to the degree of protection.  Entry and exit of SOEs does not 
seem to be the outcome of a selection mechanism based on productivity, as was strongly the case for 
private firms. The survival of unproductive SOE incumbents in highly protected sectors further 
differentiates them from other firm types. 
6. Conclusions 
We have shown that the strong productivity record of China in the time period studied, from 1995 to 
2007, is strongly and significantly related to the tariff reductions that accompanied (and preceded) 
China’s entry into the WTO.  Since most tariffs are cut to a remarkably uniform and low level, the extent 
of liberalization in each industry is almost entirely determined by the extent of initial protection.  Reverse 
causality, i.e. tariff reductions being tied to sectors’ productivity growth record, is highly unlikely to 
explain much of the correlation and moreover could only be based on expected performance.  We include 
the lagged level of protection in the regressions to control for the initial competitive environment.  The 
conclusion is that reduced protection of the domestic industry from foreign competition lead to higher 
domestic productivity growth.  
The mechanisms through which tariff reduction has exerted its impact on productivity were 
unanticipated, and slightly unusual.  No strong link could be found between tariffs and import volumes, 
including the usage of imported inputs.  However, input tariff cuts show up one-for-one in the input price 
index.  Accordingly, we find that Chinese firms accommodate such price pressure through downward 
adjustment of their price-cost margins.  Squeezed profit margins are also reflected in the selection of 
entering and exiting firms across the productivity distribution.  By decomposing sectoral productivity 
growth into contributions by continuing firms, reallocation among continuing firms, and net entry, we 
show that the association between tariffs cuts and the net entry contribution is by far the strongest link.  
Firm-level productivity changes are systematically related to tariff cuts, but only in the pre-WTO period 
does this explain a large fraction of the total relationship at the industry level.  A firm-level analysis 
further indicates that for private and foreign-owned firms, tariff reduction has systematically pushed less 
efficient firms to exit and replaced them with more productive new entrants; such a pattern does not exist 
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for state-owned firms.  Given the importance of newly entering private firms, the competitive selection 
mechanism dominates and contributes substantially to the productivity growth of the Chinese 
manufacturing sector in the period under investigation. 
These findings highlight the price pressure from potential imports and the associated competitive 
selection mechanism as an important channel through which trade liberalization affects domestic 
productivity.  This is in contrast with alternative mechanisms found in the context of trade liberalization 
in other countries, such as easier access to more varieties of and better quality inputs in the case of India 
by Goldberg et al. (2010).  The effectiveness of this mechanism implies that government should try not to 
intervene in price setting.  Secondly, the different response to tariff reduction by state-owned firms from 
private and foreign-owned firms implies that the former enjoy other forms of protection than trade 
barriers; further reform is needed to eliminate the remaining inefficiencies among the state-owned firms.  
Thirdly, our study shows that tariff reduction helps to select better private firms to enter, but it does not 
affect the size of the entering body of private firms. As a key component of the overall productivity 
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Table 1:  Industry characteristics associated with the level in tariff protection 
 Dependent variable: Output Tariff  Output Tariff  Output Tariff  
1995 2001 2007 
(1) (2) (3) 
Trade categories (BEC): 
   
  Intermediates -0.203*** -0.109*** -0.049 
 
(-2.9) (-2.7) (-1.7) 
  Capital goods -0.186*** -0.055 -0.056* 
 
(-2.6) (-1.3) (-1.9) 
  Consumer Goods  0.117 0.064 0.047 
 
(1.6) (1.5) (1.6) 
Differentiated goods (Rauch) 0.023 0.020 0.030*** 
 
(0.9) (1.4) (2.9) 
U.S. industry characteristics 
   
  Capital intensity -3.707** 1.413 1.007 
 
(-2.4) (1.6) (1.6) 
  Skill intensity -5.418** -3.770*** -2.816*** 
 
(-2.1) (-2.5) (-2.6) 
Chinese industry characteristics  
   
  Top 4 market share 0.169*** 0.071*** 0.013 
 
(3.3) (2.4) (0.6) 
  Log employment 1.869*** 1.123*** 0.247 
 
(2.8) (2.9) (0.9) 
  Log(K/L) ratio 2.033* 0.419 0.488 
 
(1.7) (0.6) (1.0) 
  SOE sales share -0.056 0.001 -0.004 
 
(-1.6) (0.0) (-0.3) 
  Elementary education share 0.461** 0.118 0.096 
  (2.3) (1.0) (1.2) 
R
2
 0.490 0.373 0.327 
Observations 380 380 380 





Table 2:  Effect of lagged productivity on current rates of protection 
 Dependent variable: Tariffs ERP NTB FDI 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(a) Pre-WTO 1995-2001 
  TFPt-1 0.003 0.011 -0.026** -0.025*** 
 
(1.6) (1.0) (-2.0) (-2.9) 
  TFPt-2 0.002 -0.004 -0.058*** -0.027*** 
  (0.9) (-0.2) (-3.2) (-2.6) 
(b) Post-WTO 2002-2007 
  TFPt-1 -0.003*** -0.009** -0.025*** -0.004 
 
(-3.7) (-2.3) (-2.9) (-0.2) 
  TFPt-2 -0.003*** -0.008* -0.027*** -0.030* 
  (-2.8) (-1.9) (-2.6) (-1.9) 





Table 3:  Effect of import tariffs on trade flows (year-on-year, 2000-2006) 
Dependent variable: Total trade Processing trade Ordinary trade Ordinary trade 
 
1-year change 1-year change 1-year change 2-year change 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged tariff change -0.425 -0.195 -0.517 -0.971* 
(-1.6) (-0.6) (-1.5) (1.9) 
Change in tariffs -1.526 -0.449 -1.947 -2.105 
(-1.3) (-1.5) (-1.3) (-1.6) 
Observations 2,442 2,372 2,409 1,998 
Notes: Regressions in first differences at the 4-digit industry level. t-statistics in parentheses. ***,**, and *  








Table 4:  Use of imported intermediates 
 
Fraction of firms using imported 
intermediates  
Imported intermediates as a share of total 
intermediates 
 









(1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
2000 11.2% 9.6% 6.2% 
 
7.8% 5.5% 2.4% 
2006 12.9% 9.8% 8.7% 
 






Table 5:  Effect of import tariffs on price indices 
Dependent variable: Output price change (ΔlnPO) Input price change (ΔlnPI) 
 
1-year change 2-year change 1-year change 2-year change 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(a) Price changes based on 2-digit CIC industries (1995-2007) 
Tariff change 0.233*** 0.294*** 1.702*** 1.932*** 
  (5.4) (6.3) (18.5) (19.1) 
(b) Price changes based on 4-digit CIC industries (2000-2007) 
Tariff change 0.297*** 0.487*** 1.023*** 1.261*** 
 
(6.1) (6.5) (10.4) (9.3) 
(c) Price changes based on 2-digit CIC industries (2000-2007)  
Tariff change 0.441*** 0.524*** 2.257*** 2.613*** 
  (7.7) (6.6) (25.2) (21.2) 
  
Dependent variable: ΔlnPCM  with PCM = (P-MC)/P 
  Without year fixed effects With year fixed effects 
 
1-year change 2-year change 1-year change 2-year change 
(d) Price-cost margin changes (1998-2007)  
ERP change 0.045** 0.058* 0.024* 0.044 
  (2.3) (1.9) (1.7) (1.5) 





Table 6:  Effect of protectionism on productivity at the firm level 
 
Balanced panel All firms Balanced panel All firms 
 
1 year changes 2 year changes 
(a) Full sample period (1998-2007), dependent variable is firm-level productivity change 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged ERP level -0.024 -0.029 -0.023 -0.032 
 
(1.3) (1.3) (1.1) (1.2) 
Change in ERP -0.166*** -0.239*** -0.189* -0.303** 
 
(3.2) (4.1) (1.9) (2.4) 
Observations 242,684 897,365 214,914 626,768 
(b) Full sample period (1998-2007), regressions in levels with firm-FE 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 











Observations 294,150 897,365 292,766 626,768 
(c) Pre-WTO period (1998-2002), firm-level productivity change 
 
(9) (10) (11) (12) 
Lagged ERP level -0.003 -0.008 0.008 0.004 
 
(0.1) (0.4) (0.5) (0.2) 
Change in ERP -0.053 -0.093** 0.032 -0.007 
 
(1.3) (2.4) (0.5) (0.1) 
Observations 241,244 362,303 180,933 626,768 
(d) Post-WTO period (2002-2007), firm-level productivity change 
 
(13) (14) (15) (16) 
Lagged ERP level -0.072** -0.060 -0.076*** -0.076* 
 
(2.5) (1.2) (2.7) (1.9) 
Change in ERP -0.440*** -0.587*** -0.521*** -0.598*** 
 
(4.0) (4.3) (3.6) (3.1) 
Observations 371,440 535,062 357,894 410,936 
Note: All regressions only include firms that did not change industries in the two years considered (for 1 or 2 year 




Table 7: Effect of tariff protection on productivity at the industry level 
Dependent variable      
is ΔTFP  







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
lagged ERP -0.082*** -0.096*** -0.070*** -0.085*** -0.087*** -0.099*** 
 (-5.8) (-5.2) (-4.6) (-3.8) (-3.3) (-3.4) 
ΔERP -0.584*** -0.610*** -0.505*** -0.493*** -0.673*** -0.807*** 
 (-10.5) (-10.4) (-7.9) (-7.7) (-7.5) (-7.8) 



























































































ΔTFP       
Gross output 
 
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
lagged ERP -0.082*** -0.060*** -0.148*** -0.113*** -0.081*** -0.019*** 
 
(-5.8) (-5.4) (-4.8) (-4.4) (-5.6) (-5.9) 
ΔERP -0.584*** -0.388*** -0.363*** -0.646*** -0.577*** -0.110*** 
 
(-10.5) (-7.6) (-4.7) (-10.0) (-10.1) (-8.7) 
Notes: NTB stands for non-tariff barriers and it measures import license requirements in a sector. t-statistics in 




Table 8:  Decomposition of the industry-level effect (following Haltiwanger, 1997) 
 
Total effect Within Between Entry –Exit 
(a) Full period (1998-2007) 
   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged ERP level -0.457
***





(2.8) (1.4) (1.2) (3.2) (2.1) 
Change in ERP -0.610
***
 -0.098 0.058 -0.613
***
 0.042 
(2.7) (1.2) (1.6) (3.2) (1.5) 
(b) Pre-WTO period (1998-2002) 
   
 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Lagged ERP level -0.087 -0.074
*
 -0.008 -0.071 0.067
**
 
(1.0) (1.7) (0.4) (1.1) (3.5) 
Change in ERP -0.228 -0.173
**
 0.000 -0.128 0.072
**
 
(1.4) (2.1) (0.0) (1.1) (2.0) 
(c) Post-WTO period (2002-2007) 
     (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 











(2.9) (2.8) (2.4) (3.2) (2.2) 
Change in ERP -0.745
***
 -0.178 -0.010 -0.597
***
 0.039 
(2.6) (1.3) (0.2) (2.9) (0.9) 
Notes: The different terms of a linear decomposition of sectoral productivity growth, combining the 
methods of Griliches and Regev (1995) and Haltiwanger (1997), are each used as dependent variable in 
separate regressions. Number of observations is 424 in each regression. t-statistics in parentheses. ***,**, 





Table 9:  Position of different types of firms in the productivity distribution 
  Dependent variable: TFP level 
  Concurrent ERP 1-year lagged ERP 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 

























































































































































































































Note: t-statistics in parentheses, standard errors are clustered at industry level. ***,**, and *  indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
 
